Had the Nehru Government paid heed to Wing Commander Nath’s learnings about Chinese military build-up on the Tibetan plateau, there would have been no scar on India’s psyche
Wing Commander Jag Mohan (Jaggi) Nath of the Indian Air Force (IAF) is the first of six Indian officers to have twice been awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), India’s second highest war-time military decoration. For 11 years, the 90-year-old Wing Commander had the privilege to fly the famous Canberras, out of which, for eight years, he worked for the top-secret 106 Squadron. He received his first MVC for his role in reconnaissance missions over the Aksai Chin and Tibet between 1960 and 1962.
Even during the Sino-Indian War (October-November 1962), he regularly flew over Tibet. The MVC citation says: “[He] fulfilled a number of hazardous operations involving flying over difficult mountain terrain, both by day and night, in adverse weather conditions and in complete disregard of his personal safety.”
His missions proved immensely useful to learn about the Chinese military build-up on the Tibetan plateau in the years preceding the 1962 war but unfortunately, the political leadership refused to believe the hard evidence gathered during his sorties and draw logical conclusions from the information gathered.
Nath’s conclusions were that in 1962, China had no Air Force worth the name on the Tibetan plateau. The fate of the Sino-Indian war could have been totally different had India used its own Air Force but the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and VK Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, chose to ignore the findings of the daring airman.
In an interview, the Wing Commander told this writer: “If we had sent a few airplanes into Tibet, we could have wiped the Chinese out and everything could have been different in the 1962 war. The political leadership did not believe me that China had no Air Force. Can you imagine what would have happened if we had used the IAF at that time? The Chinese would have never dared do anything.” It is one of the greatest tragedies of India’s modern history.
The Wing Commander remembered: “The job of the 106 Squadron was to survey these areas.” He recalled his first reconnaissance flight with 106 Squadron over the Aksai Chin: “My Commanding Officer [later Air Marshal] Randhir Singh was on leave at that time, I was alone. I was briefed by the Western Air Command to go, find out from where the Chinese have come and take photographs.”
One day, at the end of 1960, Air-Vice Marshal DAR Nanda, then IAF’s Deputy Chief, told him: “You go and take pictures and I will send an escort with you.” Another Canberra escorted Nath to protect him while he was taking pictures of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) at the edge of the Aksai Chin in Ladakh.
Nearly 60 years after the events, he is still very emotional: “I kept going down and suddenly, I saw the Chinese there. I took photographs of the Chinese soldiers all over the place. I could have taken their portraits. They were all around.” After he returned to Delhi, he went straight to the office of Krishna Menon with Nanda and in his words: “Krishna Menon did not ask anything, he just said ‘Did you see the Chinese soldiers?’ I answered ‘Yes Sir, I saw them’. ‘That’s alright, you can go’.” Nath knew that Menon later passed the information to Nehru. No reaction either.
On September 8, 1962, the Dhola Post in the Tawang sector was surrounded by some 600 Chinese soldiers; the Indian Army responded aggressively. Six weeks later, Mao’s Liberation Army massively attacked the 7 Infantry Brigade headquartered on the Namkha chu (river). The debacle which followed is well known. What is not known is the extent of knowledge the IAF had about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s deployment and the absence of the Chinese Air Force in Tibet.
On October 11, 1962, a note by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing was given to the Embassy of India in China. It brings more light on the reconnaissance work done by the 106 Squadron before (and during) the war.
The Chinese note says: “In the night of October 10, 1962, an Indian aircraft intruded into China’s air space over the suburbs of Lhasa at 20.15 hours for reconnaissance and then flew northward along the Chinghai-Tibet (Qinghai-Tibet) highway to Damshune [Damchung] where it made reconnaissance circlings over a Chinese airfield and then flew away in the direction of India.”
Damchung, north of Lhasa, was the only airport used by the Chinese in Tibet at that time; it had no air defence.
The note from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued: “The deep intrusion of Indian aircraft into China for flagrant reconnaissance over the capital city of, and an airfield in Tibet, was obviously an action coordinated with the current military attacks by the aggressive Indian troops in the eastern sector of the Sino Indian border. The Chinese Government… warns the Indian side that it must give serious thought to the grave consequences of such increasingly frantic activities of aggression.”
What to conclude? China had no Air Force able to counter the Indian reconnaissance flights and no air defence able to shoot down the planes. Had India extensively used its Air Force, what could have been different? We would have probably won the 1962 war.
One can also imagine that casualties would have been less on the Indian side and more on the Chinese. Further, the number of Indian PoWs, who suffered for seven months in Tibet, would have been far less. The Line of Actual Control would have remained where it was in September 1959 and the border dispute with China would not be as acute as today. The Shaksgam Valley would not have been offered to China by Pakistan in 1963. There would have been no scar on India’s psyche as there is today.
The fate of the Tibetan people would have certainly been different. In China, Mao Zedong would have lost his job and perhaps no Cultural Revolution would have taken place three years later. As a result, China would have been completely different today.
In 1965, Pakistan would perhaps have thought twice before venturing into Operation Gibraltar to create insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu & Kashmir, ultimately resulting in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. Three years later, India learnt its lesson that the Air Force can be useful…and by that time, there was a more decisive Chief of Air Staff (Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh). It is when Nath was awarded his second MVC. But sadly, history can’t be rewritten.
(The writer is an expert on India-China relations)
