President Muizzu is bound by campaign promises and stances. He may thaw his stand with practicalities that strengthen his political appeal

Worms are crawling out of the political woodwork in the archipelagic state of Maldives, as intrigues that go beyond simplistic assumptions, emerge. For months the Maldivian national elections were getting billed as one between the ‘pro-India’ Maldivian Democratic Party and the ‘pro-China’ People’s National Congress. Factually, the Maldivian Democratic Party under previous President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih's government (2018-2023) had restorative (after the previous term of a decidedly anti-Indian dispensation of Abdulla Yameen) and warm relations with Delhi.

Indeed, the People’s National Congress this time had campaigned on a virtual ‘India Out’ campaign. Finally, the People’s National Congress under Mohamed Muizzu won.

True to his poll promise, Mohamed Muizzu did ask the Indian Government to withdraw its personnel, albeit, whilst promising to be only ‘pro-Maldives’, and not ‘anti-India’ or ‘pro-China’, as labelled. The fact that Mohamed Muizzu ran for Presidentship only because Abdulla Yameen was legally debarred from the electoral fray due to corruption and money laundering charges and therefore ostensibly on Abdulla’s behalf, made the expectations of reversing Male’s warmth towards Delhi, in favour of Beijing, even more credible.

So far, the script played out as expected (as feared?) and Delhi decided to play a wait-and-watch game to decipher the extent of Muizzu’s supposed antipathy towards India. Would President Mohamed Muizzu be different from the image of the politically charged, accusatory and inflammatory leader of the opposition party during the electoral campaign or would he toe his supposed mentor Yameen’s tilt? Would Muizzu moderate his political rhetoric in favour of practicalities and necessities, and thereby lower the din against Delhi? It is still early days to assert conclusively, but as always in politics, there are more intrigues and undercurrents than meets the eye. Muizzu does not need to pander or remain beholden to Abdulla Yameen, beyond a point.

Completely unrelated news gripped the Maldivian discourse post the settlement of electoral dust – firstly the second-guessing of Muizzu and his politics, and secondly of soaring onion prices, an integral part of Maldivian cuisine. As India has banned exports of onions to curb its own inflationary pressures, Male is feeling the pinch with prices soaring from Maldivian Rupee 200-300 per sack to 900-1000 – alternative supplies from Pakistan and China are just not the same quality or price. It is an inadvertent example of Maldive's dependence on India for its socio-economic ‘normalcy’, and even as exemption from exports has been sought to bring about the necessary relief from inflation, the point of maintaining good relations with India is underscored.

But more grippingly, there is a murmured discomfort brewing between Mohamed Muizzu and his one-time benefactor, Abdulla Yameen, that can alter many linear assumptions, including those of Muizzu’s future equation with Delhi. The rift dates to the time when at one time Yameen wanted his party to boycott the elections, but the wider coalition started drifting in favour of Muizzu as a favoured candidate to partake in elections. Yameen ultimately acquiesced and Muizzu won the elections, but somewhere Yameen felt slighted by his purported nominee’s success.

The fact that Muizzu’s victory speech had no mention of gratitude to Yameen or to his role in winning the ballot race, was telling. While Muizzu did release Yameen from incarceration as promised during the campaign earlier, however, he didn’t bother to postpone celebratory events to accommodate Abdulla Yameen’s presence and participation in the same.

It is also being murmured that President Mohamed Muizzu is increasingly cold towards unsolicited advice and engagement coming from Abdulla Yameen as he would like to assert his own style, policies, and preferences, as befitting a duly elected President, and not as a prop for someone else. Even the run-up to Abdulla Yameen’s promised release was filled with testy vibes as Mohamed Muizzu asked Abdulla Yameen’s supporters to stay away from street protests and instead allow Mohamed Muizzu to handle Yameen’s release in his own way – clearly, Abdulla Yameen was not pleased with Muizzu’s put-down of Yameen’s supporters and with his pace to release him. The pot of discontent was brewing, for long. Further allocation of ministerial berths in the Muizzu cabinet without the active consultation or accommodation of Yameen’s preferences, further frustrated former President Yameen.

The technicality of provisions under the Prisons and Parole Act under which Yameen was released debar Yameen from formally participating in political confabulations, further ties up Yameen’s abilities to assert his own agenda. Muizzu’s apparent defiance and becoming his own political man is at the heart of Maldivian intrigues that beset its newly formed government.

How this newfound assertion by Muizzu manifests as regards, as his relationship with Delhi is concerned, is yet to be seen, however for him to be openly ‘pro-China’ as Abdulla Yameen was, may not be on the cards. Muizzu like all politicians may thaw his stand with practicalities that strengthen his political appeal as opposed to kowtowing Yameen’s agenda – one beneficiary of this situation may just be India, despite labels attached to Muizzu.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views expressed are personal)